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The Hindu 
Undivided Family: 
Effects on the Indian 
Tax System 
by Anurag Sanyal 
"To Tax and to please, no more than to love 
and be wise, is not given to man" 
- EdmundBurke, 1774 
The objective oftaxation is to raise revenue 
for the purpose ofmaintaining the government 
both in developed and developing countries. 
India's primary objectives of taxation include 
redistribution, growth, and stability. Among 
the major tax powers vested by the 
constitution to both the Union and the States, 
the personal income tax is one of the most 
important sources ofrevenue. But the system 
has its flaws. The existence of the Hindu 
Undivided Family (HUF) and the superior 
treatment given to the HUF complicates the 
assessment and collection of income tax. This 
monograph intends to describe the 
characteristic features of the system of 
succession and inheritance that is typical to a 
HUF and how the dexterous use of these 
features enables the members of a HUF to 
avoid their tax liabilities either partially or 
completely. However, it is not completely 
justified to shirk-the entire responsibility on the 
HUF. Other structural deficiencies are also 
unveiled through the course ofdiscussion and 
appropriate suggestions have been 
enumerated. 
Indian income tax laws do not discriminate 
between different sources ofincome as would 
the case be under a "scheduler" type ofincome 
tax. Thus, the Indian system of personal 
taxati'on may be called ·'globallt in principle 
and, for the most part, in practice also. In 
India the personal income tax is levied on the 
total income of all individuals, Hindu 
Undivided Families (HUF), unregistered firms, 
and other "associations of persons." Total 
income is said to be the sum ofthe tax payer's 
income under all categories, exclusive of 
certain exempt receipts which are not included 
in total income, and reduced by deduction of 
certain expenditures incurred in earning total 
income. In India, income tax is levied at 
progressive rates and the super tax, which was 
levied separately as a supplement to income 
tax, is now fully integrated with income tax. 
Indian tax law provides for the collection 
of taxes from the tax payer through one or 
more of four different processes: first, 
deductions or withholding at source at the 
time of payment of income; second, advance 
payment oftax by the tax payer himself; third, 
.	 provisional assessment and demand by the 
income tax officer; and fourth, regular 
assessment and final demand by the Income 
Tax officer (Cutt 1969, p. 87). The major 
obstacle that the tax authorities face is the 
problem of categorizing the tax paying unit 
and the resulting hindrances in the equitable 
and efficient assessment of income. This is 
primarily caused by the existence of the Hindu 
73
 
Undivided family (HUF). Then what is the 
HUF and how does it complicate the Indian 
tax sy~em? 
The Hindu joint family, called the Hindu 
undivided family--·in the - Income Tax Act­
(1961), is a type of ext~nded family system. 
The joint and undivided family is the usual 
characteristic of Hindu society; it consists of 
all persons who are lineally descended from a 
common ancestor and includes their mother, 
wives, and unmarried 'daughters bound 
together by the fundamental principle of 
"Spindaship" or family relationship which is 
one of the distinguishing features of this _ 
institution (Chawla 1972, p. 103). The laws of 
inheritance when combined with the 
succession laws provide a number ofavenues 
for the HUF to avoid income tax in some 
measure. Thus, the comprehension ofboth of 
these aspects will enable the reader to 
undetStand the efficacy of their usage by the 
HUF. 
Property, according to Hindu 
law, may be divided into two 
classes, namely, joint family 
property .and separate 
property. 
.Of the members of a joint family, those 
who' acquire by birth an interest in the joint 
(coparcenary) property are called coparceners. 
Chawla very aptly says,"the conception of a 
joint family constituting a coparcenary 
(obviously, then, a narrower body than the 
joint family) is that ofa common male ancestor 
with his lineal descendants in the male line 
with four degrees counting from and inclusive 
ofsuch ancestor." [For example; ifa person X 
is married with two sons ('P' and 'Q') and a 
daughter ('D') and P and Q get married then 
the families of P and Q together with their 
unmanied sister D fonn the joint family but by 
the Hindu Successions Act only P and Q were 
._. ~·treated·· as coparceners. Thus referring to 
Chawla's definition in the context ofthe above 
mentioned family, X is the common ancestor 
and P and Q are male lineal descendants. As P 
and Q's family extends there forms a smaller 
joint family within the parent one and with 
time there is even the fonnation of sub­
coparcenaries as the families extend.] 
~very coparcenary must have a common 
ancestor with which to start-normally the­
head of the joint family. The extant 
coparcenary is not limited to four degrees from 
the common ancestor; rather at ·any point in 
time, it is limited to four degrees from the last 
holder ofthe ancestral property which in most 
cases is the coparcener himself (Chawla, p. 
103). Suppose after the death of an ancestor, 
his two sons acquire the ancestral property by 
partition. From then on the two coparceners 
have formed their individual coparcenaries 
bestowing rights in the property to their heirs. 
The heirs will now be counted not from the 
original ancestors but within four degrees of 
the two new coparceners. This eventually 
leads to the formation of smaller HUFs. 
However, the existence ofa coparcenary is not 
a pre-requisite to the existence of a HUF, . 
because the latter can consist of a sole 
surviving male member and female members 
(like mother, wife or unmarried daughters or 
sisters). But, in the case of a lone male 
coparcener, even though he might possess the 
joint family property, he cannot be considered 
as a HUF, because "a single man cannot 
constitute a family." (Chawla, p. 106). 
The HUF also manipulates the property 
rights to procure exemptions and yield other 
tax advantages. Property, according to Hindu 
law, may be divided into two classes, namely, 
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joint family property and separate property. 
A Hindu who is a share holder ofa joint 
family, can have his own separate property. 
However, not even his son acquires any 
interest in the separate property by birth. In his 
life time the coparcener may treat his separate 
property in any fashion--throw it in the 
hotchpot of the HUF, bequeath it by will or 
even sell it. However, on his death it passes 
by intestate succession to his heirs and not by 
swvivorship to the surviving coparceners (now 
subject to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956). 
As a result of the fact that many individual 
members of the HUF may hold separate 
property there is· the emergence of many 
branches and sub-branches of a main HUF 
which are in itself a HUF. This immediately 
results in the formation of small HUFs. 
Interpreted differently, it could be said that in 
practicality the creation ofsub-HUFs results in 
the treatment ofunit families as HUFs with an 
exemption limit close to twice of what it 
originally should have been. 
An observation made by James Cutt in his 
book, Taxation And Economic Development 
in India, efficiently bolsters my argument: 
"There is one particular statutory.area of 
avoidance--the privileged tax treatment ofthe 
Hindu Undivided Family--which has been 
recently shown to represent very substantial 
revenue loss to the eXChequer." The HUF 
enjoys a basic exemption limit ofRs 7000 as 
against Rs 4000 for an individual. The 
revenue loss involved in such treatment is 
aggravated by the possibilities ofcomplete or 
partial partition and transfer ofassets open to 
the HUF, which permit the use of several 
exemption limits and lower rates on split 
incomes (Cutt 1969, p.95) 
The two main systems ofinheritance under 
Hindu Law are the 'Mitakshara' system and 
the 'Dayabhagd system. To understand the 
procedure for categorizing each HUF under a 
particular system it is essential to comprehend 
section 64 ofthe Hindu Succession Act. This 
Act sets a candid set ofcriteria that need to be 
fulfilled by a HUF in question to subscribe to 
- either of the two systems. These clauses do 
not affect the taxation procedures as it is only 
after the designation of the type that the 
characteristics come into play. The spirit of 
the Mitakshara coparcenary is the unity of 
ownership. The main incidents ofjoint family 
property under Mitakshara are (i) devolving 
by survivorship and not by succession and (ii) 
property in which the male issues of the 
coparceners acquire an interest by birth. 
According to the Dayabhaga law, the sonS"ao 
not acquire any interest by birth in the 
ancestral property. It is only on the death of 
the father leaving two male issues that a 
coparcenary is first formed. However, in the 
absence ofa male issue the heirs could be the 
deceased's widow or his daughters. A Hindu 
may dispose of his separate or self-acquired 
property by gift while a coparcener under the 
Dayabhaga law may dispose of his 
coparcenary interest by gift. A coparcener 
under Mitakshara cannot do so unless he is 
the sole surviving coparcener (Chawla, p.. 
105). This helps the coparcener under 
Dayabhaga to giv~ any coparcenary property 
to his wife or minor son and thus tactfully 
avoid the liability that would have otherwise 
been incurred had the property been under his 
ownership. It is also important to discuss the 
flexibility of the two laws with respect to 
enabling the coparceners to gift and transfer 
property. This is important in the 
understanding ofhow HUFs extend exemption 
limits and in certain situations even avoid tax 
liabilities. 
Now the questions that arise are how is all 
of this incorporated into the personal income 
tax and how does it affect the working ofthe 
system? The laws ofsuccession and property 
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rights are primarily used by the HUF to file 
exemptions and transfers so as to reduce their 
tax liability partially or even completely. The 
difference in the exemption limit coupled by 
the partition and -transfer of. assets rights .. 
already puts the HUF at an advantageous 
platfonn compared to the individual tax payer. 
This cumulated with numerous other factors, 
benefits the HUF greatly and causes disparity 
between the two different units oftax payers. 
Then what is the rationale behind taxing the 
HUF as a separate tax unit? 
The joint family differs from the unitary 
family for it is a multi generation unit. Its size 
may quite often he larger than that of an 
unitary family. On this consideration, a higher 
exemption limit is allowed to a HUF under the 
Income Tax Act provided it satisfies one ofthe 
following two conditions: 
(i) It has, at least, two members entitled to 
claim partition who are not less than 18 years 
ofage. 
(ii) It has at least two members entitled to 
claim partition who are not lineally descended 
from any other living member ofthe family. 
Another rationale behind allowing a higher 
exemption is that were the coparceners ofthe 
HUF to partition and set up as separate tax 
units, they would be entitled to separate tax 
exemptions. In reality, a family which satisfies 
either of these conditions need not be a 'big' 
family, while there also could be 'big' families 
which do not satisfy these conditions. It is 
obvious then that there is no rationale behind 
treating a HUF differently from a unitary 
family in the matter of fixing the exemption 
limit. Thus, the difference in sizes of the 
families call for differential family allowances 
and nothing else. 
The acceptance ofthe Hindu family as an 
individual tax unit reaps distinct advantages for 
it. The following advantages are not jqst 
benefits to the HUF but also threats to overall 
goals ofequity and stability. Thus: 
(i) Whatever the size of the HUF a higher 
exemption limit causes even unitary families to 
convert themselves into HUFs. 
(ii) The life insurance premium deduction from 
gross total income for a HUF is twice that of 
an individual tax payer irrespective ofthe size 
ofthe HUF or the age ofthe family members. 
(iii) The members of the HUF are, on the 
principle that there should be no double 
taxation, exempt from tax in respect of sums 
which they receive out of the income-of the 
family. 
(iv) The joint family may be partitioned, fully 
or partially, into a number ofjoint families. 
(v) The joint family may be partially 
partitioned as to property which means that 
while the joint family continues, some property 
is shared among some or all of the 
coparceners. 
(vi) A coparcener governed by Dayabhaga 
may give any property of the family to -his 
wife/minor son, while a coparcener under 
Mitakshara can do so only if he is the sole 
surviving coparcener. ' 
(vii) A Hindu at any time may throw his self 
acquired property into the common stock ofa 
HUF; thus, creating a new HUF where non 
existed before. This nonnally occurs when the 
HUF consists only of the individual and his 
immediate family, for in the case of a larger 
HUF the other members would also be holders 
of the individuals' property. This enables the 
individual to transfer part ofhis property to his 
wife and children and consequently circumvent 
the income tax act (section 64). This may be 
repeated by a person any number oftimes. 
With the influx of modernization, the 
number of HUFs was expected to decrease. 
But this is not so. Although sociological 
studies and surveys have indicated a decline in 
the joint family system, I.S. Gulati and K.S. 
Gulati in their study have .shown that the HUF 
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as -a tax payer~ "is not only not a vanishing 
entity but one which is likely to hold its part of 
the ground in the foreseeable future" (Gulati, 
p. 23). Though the principles of Spindaship 
(ie. sharing the same house,. food and place of 
worship) are not followed yet, on paper, these 
families stand to be miFs. Why so? The 
prime reason being that the beneficiaries can 
then save a greater proportion oftheir income 
by protecting it under the cover of high 
exemptions and transfer facilities available to 
an original HUF. These benefits get multiplied 
even more because of the small size of these 
families. 
As mentioned earlier, the intelligent use 
of the exemptions available to the HUF can 
cause immense losses to the exchequer. James 
Cutt in his book, Taxation and Economic 
Development in India. says, "A calculation 
made ofthe maximum tax avoidance available 
to ae HUF, through varied combinations of 
complete partition, partial partition and 
transfers by gifts shows that by dextrous 
employment of avoidance techniques a HUF 
can earn up to Rs 58000 (8 times the actual 
exemption limit) without incurring any income 
tax liability. An aggregate computation of 
annual loss to the exchequer on account of 
avoidance action ofHuF provides an average 
figure ofRs 800 million ($27 million) and Rs 
1500 million ($50million)." 
I, think treating HUFs as a 
separate entity threatens the 
basic essence of secularity 
that has been embodied in 
the spirit of India. 
With the cons related to the existence of 
the HUF already discussed, I find it 
appropriate to raise a question that has been 
b·oggling my mind ever since I have started 
writing this paper. It is true that India is 
described as a "Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, 
.. Democratic, Republic." I think treating HUFs 
as a separate entity threatens the basic essence 
of secularity that has been embodied in the 
spirit ofIndia. It is certainly not true that only 
the Hindus have "big" families. With a 
minority of Muslims (12%), Christians, 
Zoroastrians, Jains, and Buddhists, it is 
implicitly discriminatory for Hindus to have a 
separate option .enabling them to exempt 
themSelves from their tax liabilities. However, 
the existence ofthe HUF can be understood by 
the circumstances at the time ofits origin. 
The origin of the HUF lies· essentially in 
the 1937 amendment ofthe Hindu Succession 
Act which was a decade before independence 
and the existence ofother religions at that time 
was a negligible minority except for the 
Muslims (who too were relatively small in ­
number). Thus, among other economic 
reasons the creation ofthe ~ was primarily 
done by the British to pamper the Hindu feudal 
families and earn their loyalty by creating an 
ameliorated position for them over the· 
common Indian. With the support ofthe elite 
Hindu feudals it was possible for the British to 
thwart the relentless efforts of the Indians to 
free themselves from the "British Raj." I feel 
the existence of the HUF and the superior 
treatment of assessing their tax liabilities are 
not in accordance with secularity and not in 
the spirit ofdemocracy. 
But it is not entirely justified to say that 
the problems of inequity, inefficiency, 
avoidance, and evasion--some of the major 
hurdles that the Indian personal income tax 
faces--are solely due to the existence of the 
HUF. There are other factors too, that find 
their moorings in some ofthe basic principles 
of taxation that India follows. The Indian 
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definition of income causes many problems 
emerging out of the narrow and convergent • 
nature of the definition. Professor Kaldor 
argued in 1956 to introduce a wider definition 
ofincome in India and· to embrace all beneficial 
receipts which increase the tax payers 
spending power and not merely the 
conventional forms of income included in the 
tax base. This advocacy of a wider base 
strikes a common chord with the definition 
proposed earlier by Haig and Simon. Though 
this broad definition is gaining strength among 
most fiscal theorists, until the early seventies, 
only the classification ofthe short term capital 
gains as ordinary income was the only step 
towards broadening the base (Budget 1967­
68). Since then, no significant step has been 
taken to broaden the tax base. It has always 
been an important concern of most fiscal 
theorists to include the agriculture tax into the 
personal income tax as it holds a major share 
of revenue resource for the government but 
not many steps have been taken towards the 
matter. Broadening of the tax base shall 
definitely solve many problems, and 
incorporating the agriculture income into the 
base is an advisable first step. 
In terms of horizontal equity and revenue 
productivity, income must be defined as net 
accretion, or change in the spending power of 
the taxable unit over a specified period oftime. 
The change in the taxable units spending 
power can be measured by the sum of the 
consumption, gifts, and change in net worth of 
assets (Cutt, p. 94). Such a base includes all 
additions to spending over a period without 
regard to source, form, or whether consumed 
or saved. This is yet another means of 
creating an ideal tax base. But, the 
implementation of this action needs to take 
into consideration the administrative feasibility 
of this kind of a proposal. Among other 
problems, this kind of a scheme involves the 
problem of full disclosure on the tax payers' 
p~. But with a strong administration and an 
honest constituency this issue could be dealt 
with. 
. .. The discriminatory treatment accorded to 
fluctuating incomes is the standard argument 
used to condemn progressive tax rates. Under 
a procedure of yearly assessment a tax payer 
whose income fluctuates from year to year will 
pay a greater proportion of his income in tax 
than a taxpayer having the same average 
income more evenly distributed from year to 
year. This is a violation of the principle of 
horizontal equity. This can be avoided by 
introducing the process of averaging, but the 
problem that comes up is to decide what will 
be the most appropriate tool. A suggestion 
could be to imitate the 60's methods used by 
Wisconsin and Australia, i.e. the five year 
average method (Vickrey 1947, p.169). 
Among other built in problems th~t the 
Indian Personal Taxation system has is the 
relatively high level ofexemption. In 1965 an 
exemption ofRs. 4,000 was ten times the per 
capita income of Rs. 421.50. This 
consequently resulted in the exclusion of600!'c. 
of the urban income, which provides for 
almost all of Union non-corporation income 
tax revenue, from taxation (planning 
Commission Report 1965, p.70). The 
Planning Commission continued to report that 
with a reduction in exemption levels to Rs 
2,000 it would bring 23% of income into the 
taxation network and would result in an 
immediate increase ofRs 1000 million to ($30 
million) the exchequer. 
With issues like the discriminatory 
treatment of the HUF and the individual tax 
payer, avoidance and evasion of the personal 
income tax, problems related to progressivity, 
relatively high levels of exemptions, an 
exclusive definition of income resulti~g in a 
narrow tax base and adverse incentives to tax 
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payers overshadowing the Indian personal 
Income Tax; it definitely calls for redemption. 
To complement all the measures already 
discussed implicitly while investigating the 
problems there are· a ·,few more suggestions 
that directly aim to ensure horizontal equity 
especially when treating the HUF. Thus: 
(i) the family should be treated as the tax unit; 
a scheme ofadequate family allowances should 
be incorporated with it. 
(ii) the HUF should not be accorded' any 
distinct treatment; some of its aspects would 
have to be ignored for tax purposes; others 
can be fitted into the scheme of family 
taXation. . 
(iii) Intra-family gifts should be ignored; those 
made to individuals outside the family 
household should be treated as the recipients 
income. 
I personally believe that among all the 
problems related to personal taxation in India, 
the problem ofavoidance and evasion call for- -­
immediate attention. With 36% ofthe Indian 
currency revolving in a parallel black market 
economy, it is not to be too demanding to ask 
for a more resilient tax system. (India Today, 
June 1993). The T.E.C. defined the concept 
ofavoidance 'and evasion unequivocally: 
"Leakage in revenue may occur either 
through a deliberate distortion offacts relating 
to an assessment after the liability has been 
incurred, or by so arranging one's affairs 
before the liability is incurred as to prevent its 
occurrence or t9 reduce the incidence of the 
tax within the framework of the existing 
legislation. The former set of transactions is 
usually referred to as 'evasion' and the latter as 
'avoidance,'.... Both avoidance and evasion 
result in the loss ofrevenue to the government, 
'but the former has the color of legality about 
it. In the net result, the burden on the honest 
citizen increases protanto" (T.E.C. Vol 2, pp. 
189-190). 
I personally believe that 
among all the problems 
.. related to' personal taxation 
in India, the problem of 
avoidance and evasion call 
for immediate action. 
It is clear that the difference between 
avoidance and evasion is only ofdegree; both 
offend the spirit ofthe law although the former 
may technically conform to its letter. 
However, evasion is a more serious problem. 
Avoidance may be dealt with by defining the 
tax base in a more concrete manner and also 
meticulously drafting new legislation so as to 
patch up the existing loopholes in the law. 
Evasion too nee~s to be prevented by the use 
of the aforementioned techniques combined 
with the use of a variety of techniques to 
promote accurate disclosure and through 
severe punishment ofoffenders. I believe with 
the opening ofthe economy and a more liberal 
tax atmosphere the urge and need to avoid and 
evade will definitely decline. 
In the past tWo years, Dr. Man Mohan 
Singh, the present Finance Minister of India 
has been working towards liberalizing the 
country's economy and is simultaneously trying 
to sew the loopholes in the system. The 
Personal Income Tax is also awaiting major 
reforms. With a discrete and intelligent 
handling of the HUF as well as the other 
discrepancies discussed in this paper, India 
should definitely be able to strike a positive 
balance between equity and efficiency. The 
results ofthe trade off shall greatly be in favor 
of the nation's growth and overall stability. 
With the corporate taxation reduced' from 40% 
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to a low of 20% in certain industries, the 
future ofthe personal income tax seems to be 
encouraging for the payer and shall definitely 
help India step into the twenty-first century 
with a strong infrastructure. 
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